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Searching for a Solution: The Lanham Acts Use 
in Commerce Requirement in Search Engine 
Keyword Advertising Cases* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet advertising generated $16.8 billion in revenue in 2006, an 
increase of 34% from the prior year.1  This advertising boom affects both 
businesses and consumers.  For consumers, it means wading through 
hundreds of pop-up advertisements, in-site advertisements, or search 
engine sponsored links during routine Web surfing and shopping.  For 
businesses, it entails spending millions of dollars to advertise in a 
relatively new form of media.2  One of the largest components of Internet 
advertising is search engine keyword advertising.  Search engine 
keyword advertising, which represents more than 40% of all Internet 
advertising in the United States,3 is an enormous source of income for 
Internet search engine companies.4  In this type of advertising, a business 
will purchase a specific term from a search engine as a trigger for an 
advertisement. When a computer user inputs this term into the search 
engine, the search engine will generate results according to the search 
engine parameters.  In addition, the computer users input will trigger an 
advertisement purchased by the business that is linked to this inputted 
term.  For example, Kodak could purchase the term cameras from 
Yahoo!, a popular Internet search engine.  Upon a search of the term 
cameras by a computer user, in addition to the normal list of results 
related to the inputted term, Yahoo! will also present an advertisement by  
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 1. In Brief: Online Ad Revenue Sets Record for a Third Year, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2007, at 
B4. 
 2. See, e.g., Louise Story, Marketers Demanding Better Count of the Clicks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2006, at C1 (Proctor & Gamble spent $33.5 million on Internet advertising in 2005). 
 3. See John Markoff & Nat Ives, Web Search Sites See Clicks Add up to Big Ad Dollars, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at A1 (In 2004, keyword search advertising represented more than 40% of total 
Internet advertising spending). 
 4. See, e.g., Today in Business: Trial on Google Ad System, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2007, at C2 
(The AdWords system made up 98% of Googles $10.6 billion in revenue in 2007). 
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Kodak.  In most cases, advertisers can purchase any search term desired 
as a trigger, including the trademarks of their competitors. 
The ability to purchase another businesss trademarks as search 
terms has yielded a substantial amount of litigation in recent years.5  
Throughout the United States, multiple businesses have sued search 
engines and search keyword purchasers for various forms of trademark 
infringement, including actions granted under the Lanham Act of 1946.6  
Courts across the country disagree as to whether the purchase and sale of 
trademarked search terms constitutes Lanham Act trademark 
infringement.7  Given the continued growth of the Internet, such 
litigation has sweeping ramifications for consumers, businesses, and 
more importantly, search engines.  The majority of the litigation centers 
around one particular search engine: Google.  Earning up to $1.50 per 
mouse click on a triggered advertisement, Google can earn more than $1 
billion in the span of just three months on the sales of search term 
advertisements.8  Therefore, the outcome of such litigation will have 
large repercussions that will be felt for years to come. 
The judicial split focuses primarily on just three words: use in 
commerce.  This term is a required element for a valid trademark 
infringement claim under the Lanham Act.9  Some courts, including 
courts in the Second Circuit, hold that the purchase and sale of 
trademarked search terms does not constitute a use in commerce, and 
preclude any cause of action.10  Other courts, relying on the same factual 
circumstances, hold that the purchase and sale of trademarked search 
terms constitutes a use in commerce, thereby allowing a claim to proceed 
on its merits.11  This Comment examines the plain meaning of each 
element within the statutory definition of use in commerce, and 
assesses the rulings of courts in the Second Circuit.  This Comment 
argues that these rulings rest on flawed underpinnings, and that the 
purchase and sale of trademarked search terms as triggers for search 
engine keyword advertising constitutes a use in commerce. 
                                                          
 5. See infra Part II.C. 
 6. Lanham Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
10511127 (2000)). 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. See Markoff & Ives, supra note 3 (reporting the sum of $1 billion of advertising during the 
last three months of 2004). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (2000). 
 10. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 11. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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Section II will explore the background of this judicial split in greater 
detail.12  It will begin with an explanation of the mechanisms and 
processes of search engines, including how advertisers use search terms 
to create advertisements and sponsored links.13  Section II will also 
detail the different trademark infringement causes of action provided 
under the Lanham Act that are the subject of the split, including a brief 
discussion of the statutory definition of use in commerce provided in 
the Act.14  The Comment will present the various preliminary 
assumptions relied upon throughout this Comments analysis.15  The 
Comment will then summarize the representative cases regarding the 
issue of use in commerce.16 
Section III will provide various alternative analyses to examine 
whether the purchase and sale of trademarked search term keywords 
constitutes a use in commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act.17  
First, Section III will demonstrate the correct interpretation of the phrase 
in the ordinary course of trade.18  Section III next will explore 
expository statements about what constitutes use in commerce with 
regard to goods and services.19  Specifically, Section III will detail how 
the use of the trademarked keywords constitutes advertising within the 
services expository statement, which in turn is applicable to most 
Internet commerce.20  Section III will conclude that the analyses and 
arguments relied upon by the courts in the Second Circuitin holding 
that there is not a use in commerce in the purchase and sale of 
trademarked search termsare flawed and incorrect.21  The Comment 
will describe how the various analogies relied on by those courts, 
including the internal utilization and product placement analogies, 
are factually and contextually flawed, and therefore unreliable.22  From 
this, the Comment will propose a solution that will allow search engines 
and advertisers to accomplish their advertising strategies while avoiding 
Lanham Act liability.23  This solution relies, by analogy, on the yellow 
                                                          
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.C. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See infra Part III.C. 
 22. See infra Part III.C.12. 
 23. See infra Part III.D. 
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page and white page listings of a typical phone book, and applies its 
distinctions to todays digital world.24 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of Search Engine Advertising and Advertiser Purchases of 
Search Terms 
When searching for a particular companys Web site, an Internet user 
has two primary options.25  The first is to guess that the company uses 
its name or trademark as its domain name, in which case a computer 
user would input that domain name into the Internet browser;26  the 
second is to enter the companys name or trademark into an Internet 
search engine.27  Google, Yahoo!, Windows Live Search, and AOL 
Search are all popular Internet search engines that, upon the input of a 
specific word or phrase, generate a list of Web sites listed by relevancy.  
A search term may be any term that the user believes may assist her in 
retrieving the information sought, such as a proper name . . . , a generic 
term . . . , or a trademark.28  For example, a computer user could enter 
the word football, Joe Montana, or the National Football League 
into Googles search field.  The search engine [then] compares the 
search terms entered by [the] user with databases of Web sites and 
generates a listing of the sites matching those terms.29  This listing is 
known as an organic listing[].30  Each search engine uses its own 
proprietary code in determining what order the Web sites should appear 
in the organic listing.  Web site owners do not pay or solicit these listings 
in any way other than by providing code within their Web site designed 
to attract the search engines search parameters. 
Along with these organic listings, search engines also provide 
advertisements or sponsored links.31  Google, for example, sells 
advertising linked to search terms, so that when a [computer user] enters 
a particular search term, the results page displays not only a list of 
                                                          
 24. Id. 
 25. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Govt Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 70102 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 29. Govt Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *2 (E.D. 
Va. Aug. 8, 2005). 
 30. Id. 
 31. E.g., Govt Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (stating that Google and Overture 
sell these advertisements and links in addition to the organic listing). 
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Websites generated by the search engine program using neutral and 
objective criteria, but also links to Websites of paid advertisers.32  Other 
search engines like GoTo.com have a pay-for-priority system where 
advertisers bid for specific search terms, giving priority in the listing to 
the highest paying advertiser.33  In these pay-for-priority listings, each 
advertisers rank in the search results is determined by the amount of its 
bid on the search term entered by the [computer] user.34  Once all the 
paying advertisers have been listed as search results, the unpaid organic 
listings are then displayed.35 
Googles system of displaying sponsored links is a product of its 
AdWords program.36  AdWords allows an advertiser to bid on search 
terms, known as keywords.37  Google then links these keywords to the 
advertisers advertisements or hyperlinks.38  When a computer user 
conducting a Web search inputs the keyword that the advertiser had 
purchased into the search engine, the sponsored link or advertisement is 
triggered and appears either immediately above or to the right of the 
organic search results.39  The sponsored link is designed to appear similar 
but not identical to the organic search results, thereby allowing a 
computer user to infer that the sponsored link is the most relevant 
website among the search results.40  Clicking on the link with the 
computer users mouse sends the computer user to the advertisers Web 
site.41  The advertiser then pays Google based on the number of clicks 
on the sponsored links.42  Other search engines, such as Netscape and 
Excite, utilize similar mechanisms allowing advertisers to either bid for 
or purchase specific search terms.43 
                                                          
 32. Id. 
 33. 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 277 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 27778. 
 36. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  See, e.g., Google Home Page, http://www.google.com (search using the word Ford) 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2008). 
 41. Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commcns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 102223 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (involving Netscape and Excite); Govt Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 
2d 700, 70102 (E.D. Va. 2004) (involving Overture Services, Inc.). 
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With a few limitations,44 search engines allow a company to 
purchase any search term as a sponsored link trigger, including 
trademarks.45  More specifically, search engines allow an advertiser to 
purchase the trademark of its competitor as a sponsored link trigger.  
Recently, advertiser purchases of competitor trademarks and sales of 
these trademarks by search engines have forced courts to wrestle with the 
issue of whether these activities constitute trademark infringement under 
federal or state law.46 
B. The Lanham Act of 1946 
Congress enacted the Lanham Act47 on July 5, 1946 [t]o provide for 
the registration and protection of trade-marks [sic] used in commerce,48 
thereby repealing and replacing the Trade-Mark Act of 1905.49  The prior 
Trade-Mark Act of 1905 was ineffective due to many limitations and 
inconsistencies that diminished its enforcement and applicability in 
twentieth-century commerce.50  Congresss underlying purpose in 
enacting the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common law of 
unfair competition and trademark protection.51 
The Lanham Act codified two important provisions granting a civil 
cause of action for trademark infringement.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) 
imposes liability for trademark infringement on: 
[a]ny person who shall, without the consent of the registrantuse in 
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of 
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection  
 
                                                          
 44. Google, for example, will only remove trademarks that appear in the text of a purchased 
advertisement after notification from the complaining party.  Google Trademark Complaint 
Procedures, http://www.google.com/tm_complaint_adwords.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). 
 45. E.g., Google AdWords Learning Center, http://www.google.com/adwords/learningcenter/ 
text/19466.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) (With Google AdWords, advertisers may select 
trademarked terms as keywords or use them in the content of the ad.). 
 46. Alan Cohen, The Search for an Answer, 5 IP LAW & BUS. 12, §§ 23 (2007) http://www. 
iplawandbusiness.com, available at http://www.westlaw.com (sign in and enter 8/2007 IPLBUS 12 
into the find citation field). 
 47. Lanham Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051
1127 (2000)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 444. 
 50. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 5:3
4 (Thompson/West 2007) (1984). 
 51. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., concurring) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 1333 (1946)). 
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with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive.52 
Similarly, § 1125(a)(1)(A) grants a civil cause of action for 
infringement of unregistered marks against: 
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation 
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, whichis likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person.53 
The only relevant distinction between these two provisions is that the 
former provision applies to registered trademarks and the latter applies to 
unregistered trademarks. 
The split of authority regarding the legality of the purchase and sale 
of trademarks as keywords for search engine advertising and sponsored 
links focuses primarily on the phrase use in commerce, a specific 
element found within each provision.54  The use in commerce 
requirement reflects Congresss lack of power to regulate all trademark 
use.55  That is, the Commerce Clause only permits Congress to regulate 
trademark use that falls within the ambit of Congresss enumerated 
powers.56  The use-in-commerce provisions limit the Lanham Act in 
order to satisfy the Commerce Clause.57  Section 1127 defines use in 
commerce as mean[ing] the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.58  It 
further explains this definition by developing two similar instances of 
when a trademark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce.59  For 
goods, a trademark is used in commerce when 
                                                          
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
 53. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
 54. Cohen, supra note 46, at 1. 
 55. Patrick Frye, An Internet Advertising Service Can Constitute Use in Commerce, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 89, 9798 (2005). 
 56. Id.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting the power to regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 50, at § 5:3. 
 57. See Frye, supra note 55, at 98 (detailing prior federal trademark laws struck down for want 
of Constitutional authority). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 59. Id. 
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it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the 
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or 
if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on 
documents associated with the goods or their sale, and . . . the goods 
are sold or transported in commerce.60 
For services, a trademark is used in commerce when it is used or 
displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are 
rendered in commerce . . . .61  As a result, a successful trademark 
infringement claim must fall within the use in commerce requirement as 
outlined by the language of § 1127 or the examples provided within the 
statute. 
Traditionally, identifying the existence of a use in commerce under 
the Lanham Act for goods or services was relatively straightforward.62  
In reference to a good, selling a tangible product with anothers 
trademark affixed to the carton was sufficient to constitute a use in 
commerce.63  Although not quite as obvious for services, displaying a 
competitors trademark in an advertisement for a service would likely 
satisfy this requirement.  For example, an advertisement for a package 
delivery service (such as UPS) displaying its competitors (such as 
FedEx) trademark would be a use in commerce.  However, the advent of 
the Internet has substantially complicated the issue of whether a use in 
commerce exists, because there is no tangible product.64  In fact, many 
courts refuse to answer this question as a matter of law due to the 
questions relative difficulty and complicated factual analysis.65 
This broad issue affects multiple areas of the Internet.  First, courts 
have wrestled with whether domain names containing competitor 
trademarks constitute a use in commerce, and ultimately, trademark 
infringement.  The issue of what constitutes trademark infringement 
                                                          
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Mark Bartholomew, Making a Mark in the Internet Economy: A Trademark Analysis of 
Search Engine Advertising, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 179, 187 (2005). 
 63. Id.; see Cohen, supra note 46, at 1 (stating how for traditional goods such as soda cans or 
cereal boxes, a use in commerce only required affixing the trademark to the goods). 
 64. Cohen, supra note 46, at 1; see Rescuecom Corp. v. Computer Troubleshooters USA, Inc., 
464 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (stating how the use of keywords as sponsored link 
triggers does not seamlessly mesh with traditional Lanham analysis). 
 65. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp., 464 F. Supp. 2d at 126667 (The . . . case triggers a novel 
legal question with factual underpinnings that are not yet clear to this court.  The Courts limited 
understanding of the matter suggests that this dispute does not seamlessly mesh with traditional 
Lanham analysis and that the transposition will require more factual development of the 
record . . . .); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL 
832398, at *56 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (declining Googles motion to dismiss as a matter of law 
until there is further development of the factual record). 
07 - COLYER FINAL.DOC 6/17/2008  9:10:19 PM 
2008] SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION 687 
covers a broad spectrum of cases, from cases where the domain name 
contains only the competitors trademark surrounded by www. and 
.com (such as www.ford.com) to cases of longer domain names 
containing a trademark within only part of the domain name, (such as 
www.thisisahypotheticalwebsite/stillahypo/123456789/ford.com).66 
Another area of the Internet dealing with the use in commerce 
requirement involves metatags.  A metatag is a list of words normally 
hidden in a web site that acts as an index or reference source identifying 
the content of the web site for search engines.67  Most courts have 
determined that using metatags of a competitors trademark in ones Web 
site constitutes a use in commerce and allow a trademark infringement 
claim to proceed.68 
C. The Split of Authority over Use in Commerce 
The more recent question regarding the Lanham Acts use in 
commerce requirement is its relation to search engine advertising via 
search term keywords.  The specific issue is whether the purchase or sale 
of trademarked keywords that trigger advertisements and sponsored links 
constitutes a use in commerce.  In the last ten years, various courts have 
been forced to deal with this unique issue.  Federal district courts within 
the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have affirmatively held that 
the purchase or sale of trademarks as keywords triggering advertisements 
and sponsored links constitutes a Lanham Act use in commerce.69  
Conversely, district courts in the Second Circuit have dismissed Lanham 
Act trademark infringement litigation by holding that purchases and sales 
of trademarked keywords are not uses in commerce.70  Without guidance 
                                                          
 66. E.g., Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 
2003) (discussing whether defendants use of the plaintiffs trademark Lap Traveler in the domain 
name a2zsolutions.com/desks/floor/laptraveler/dkfl-lt.htm constituted Lanham Act trademark 
infringement). 
 67. MCCARTHY, supra note 50, at § 25:69. 
 68. See, e.g., Brookfield Commcns v. W. Coast Entmt Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 105253, 1064
65 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the defendants affirmative use of the plaintiffs trademark as a metatag 
constitutes a valid claim of trademark infringement, an element of which is use in commerce); J.G. 
Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. Pship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115,  at *6 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (holding that the defendants incorporation of plaintiffs marks in its 
keyword meta tags [sic] constitute [sic] trademark use under the Lanham Act). 
 69. See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 
2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (Ninth Circuit); J.G. Wentworth, 2007 WL 30115 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (Third Circuit); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-
4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (Eighth Circuit); Govt Employees Ins. 
Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (Fourth Circuit). 
 70. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding 
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from Congress or the Supreme Court, this split of authority appears 
destined to extend into the future. 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.71 and Google Inc. v. American 
Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.72 represent the competing arguments 
sufficiently for a valid analysis of this judicial conflict.  The factual basis 
of each case is sufficiently similar to allow a proper analysis of the 
arguments.  However, several preliminary matters must be addressed 
before any such analysis is undertaken.  Initially, there are several other 
arguments either presented or relied upon in all the cases in determining 
whether a valid claim of Lanham Act trademark infringement exists.  For 
example, many cases consider whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion in determining if a trademark has been infringed.73  Although 
relevant to the ultimate analysis of whether trademark infringement has 
ultimately occurred, this Comment does not address these issues but 
rather focuses solely on whether the use in commerce element exists in 
these cases. 
Secondly, for purposes of this Comment, purchasers and sellers of 
keywords will be treated as being similarly situated in relation to 
potential Lanham Act liability.  In other words, purchasers and sellers of 
these search terms will be treated as equally liable or not liable.  There 
are several reasons for this besides merely narrowing the issue.  First, 
courts tend to approach the analysis as hinging upon the same issues 
regardless of whether the alleged infringer is the purchaser or seller of 
keywords.74  Second, the Lanham Act recognizes theories of secondary 
liability.75  According to Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, 
Inc.,76 a party can be contributorily liable for trademark infringement if 
that party continues to supply its service to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.77  Thus, the fact 
that a search engine supplies a product (the keyword purchase system, 
                                                          
that defendants use of plaintiffs trademark is not a use within the Lanham Act). 
 71. 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 72. No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007). 
 73. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 411 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 74. Compare Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.N.J. 
2006) (alleged infringer purchaser of trademarked keyword), and 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, 
Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006) (alleged infringer seller of trademarked keyword). 
 75. 800-JR Cigar, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d at 280 (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & 
Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 143233 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 76. 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
 77. See id. (stating that a manufacturer or distributor can be liable for continuing to supply its 
product to a known trademark infringer); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, 
Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1432 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that the doctrine in Inwood Labs is not confined to 
manufacturers). 
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like AdWords) and has knowledge of the keyword purchasers 
infringement of the competitors trademark is sufficient to create liability 
under the Lanham Act, assuming that all other elements of the cause of 
action are met.78  Lastly, the statutory language of the Lanham Act 
causes of action themselves are sufficiently broad in scope to grant 
potential liability to both purchasers and sellers.  For example, § 
1114(1)(a) applies to any person . . . in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or 
services . . . using a reproduction of a registered mark.79  By selling 
these keywords, a search engine provider is connected to the sale and 
advertising of the trademarks.80  Likewise, a purchaser of the 
trademarked keywords is using the trademark in advertising any good or 
service.  Similarly, § 1125(a)(1) applies to any person using a symbol 
in connection with any goods or services.81  Given the similar 
treatment of purchasers and sellers of search term keywords, this 
Comment will assume the relative arguments supporting and precluding 
uses in commerce apply to each party with relatively equal weight. 
1. The Arguments of the District Dourts in the Second Circuit: 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. 
District courts in the Second Circuit repeatedly have held that the 
purchase or sale of trademarks as search engine keywords does not 
constitute a use in commerce.82  These holdings consistently rely on 
similar arguments and precedents, regardless of any factual differences in 
the cases.  Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc,83 which relies heavily on 1-
800 Contracts v. WhenU.com,84 represents these courts stance regarding 
whether search engine keyword purchases and sales constitute trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act. 
In Rescuecom, plaintiff Rescuecom Corporation (Rescuecom) was 
a computer services franchising business owning the registered 
trademark Rescuecom and operating the successful Web site 
                                                          
 78. The two elements for contributory trademark infringement are . . . (1) supply of a product, 
and (2) knowledge of direct infringement.  Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 
1492, 1498 (E.D. Cal. 1994) revd, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
 80. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 82. Fragrancenet.com, Inc. v. Fragrancex.com, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 55253 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (discussing four cases relying on this holding). 
  83. 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 84. 44 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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Rescuecom.com.85  Averaging 17,000 to 30,000 visitors per month, the 
Web site advertised its consulting, networking, and Internet services to 
customers and potential franchisees.86  According to the court, 
Rescuecoms famous name and trademark, as well as its reputation for 
excellence, distinguish its goods and services from its competition and 
lead potential franchisees and customers to search for Rescuecom 
Corporation specifically through a variety of means, including 
Google.87 
Rescuecom filed suit against Google alleging, among other claims, 
Lanham Act trademark infringement for selling the Rescuecom 
trademark to Rescuecoms competitors as a keyword triggering the 
appearance of the competitors sponsored links.88  Google responded by 
filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that the sale did not amount to a 
trademark use within the meaning of the Lanham Act.89  The court, 
after recognizing the split of authority among district courts regarding the 
use in commerce requirement, agreed with Google that the use 
requirement was not satisfied.90  In so holding, the court relied upon 
several key arguments advanced by the appellate and district courts 
before it. 
The first tenet of the Rescuecom holding regarded the actual 
construction of the term use in commerce.  The Rescuecom court 
stressed that a finding could not be based strictly on a use in commerce, 
but rather, must be split into three separate elements: use, in 
commerce, and likelihood of confusion.91  In the courts view, 
precedent in other circuits put the cart before the horse by basing the 
finding of a trademark use on the confusion caused by such use.92  The 
court defined the sub-element of trademark use as indicating source 




                                                          
 85. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 39596. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 398401. 
 91. Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 399400 (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 
414 F.3d  400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 92. See id. (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 93. Id. at 400 (quoting Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
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argued that the trademark use occurred through three94 different 
mechanisms, thereby triggering Lanham Act liability.95 
The first mechanism proffered by Rescuecom was that Google 
capitalized on the goodwill associated with Rescuecoms trademark by 
marketing it to Rescuecoms competitors.96  The court refuted this 
argument, relying on the separation of trademark use and in 
commerce as demonstrated in 1-800 Contacts.  Analogizing search 
engines to the pop-up advertisements at issue in 1-800 Contacts, the 
court held that Rescuecom failed to establish that capitalizing on this 
goodwill constituted trademark use, and that the plaintiff had only 
alleged the in commerce element in its complaint.97 
Rescuecom next argued that trademark use occurred when Google 
allowed the triggered sponsored links to divert[] and misdirect[] Internet 
users away from [Rescuecoms] website.98  The court refuted this 
argument by relying on an analogy found within 1-800 Contacts, stating 
that displaying the sponsored links alongside the organic search results 
was similar to a drug store placing its own store-brand generic products 
next to the trademarked products they emulate.99  This comparison 
mirrors the analogy offered in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health 
Consulting, Inc.,100 cited by many district courts in the Second Circuit to 
support the rule that a party can use a trademarked name to convey to 
consumers what it is their product seeks to copy; in such cases, 
defendants are not trying to get the good will of the name, but the good 
will of the goods.101  Along with its analogy, the Rescuecom court 
distinguished contrary holdings that such search engine triggers 
                                                          
 94. Rescuecom actually presented four arguments, but only three have merit.  The fourth 
argument was that Google used the mark by preventing Internet users from reaching Rescuecoms 
Web site by displaying the sponsored links alongside the actual search result listing of 
Rescuecom.com.  Id. at 402.  Rescuecom reasoned that by displaying both the sponsored link and 
Rescuecom.com, an Internet user could not click on both the sponsored link and Rescuecoms link 
simultaneously.  Id.  Rescuecom argued that this inability constituted Google using the trademark in 
violation of the Lanham Act.  Id.  The court dismissed this argument.  Id. at 40203.  Because no 
other circuit relies on an argument similar to Rescuecoms, this Comment will ignore this argument 
as well. 
 95. Id. at 400. 
 96. Id. at 40001. 
 97. See id. (Although these facts may suffice to satisfy the in commerce . . . requirement[] 
at the pleading stage, without an allegation of trademark use in the first instance, they cannot sustain 
a cause of action for trademark infringement.). 
 98. Id. at 402. 
 99. Id. at 40103 (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 41011 (2d 
Cir. 2005)). 
 100. 431 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 101. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 38081 (1910)). 
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constituted uses in commerce by demonstrating that these contrary 
holdings involved advertisements actually displaying the plaintiffs 
trademarks.102 
The final argument proffered by Rescuecom was that Googles 
internal use of the plaintiffs trademark constituted a use within the 
Lanham Act.103  The court refuted this argument by reasoning that 
Google did not place the plaintiffs trademark on any goods, containers, 
displays, or advertisements, or that its internal use [of the trademark] is 
visible to the public.104  The court supported its argument by relying on 
the 1-800 Contacts courts analysis that such use is analogous to a [sic] 
individuals private thoughts about a trademark, and therefore does not 
violate the Lanham Act.105  This individual private thoughts analogy 
is relied upon extensively by most district courts in the Second Circuit.106  
Concluding with this analogy, the court dismissed the Lanham Act claim 
against Google for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.107 
2. The Arguments of the District Courts in the Third, Fourth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits 
Unlike in Rescuecom, the arguments supporting the viewpoint of the 
district courts in the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuitsthat the 
purchase or sale of trademarks as search engine keywords constitutes a 
use in commerceare not easily found within one representational case.  
The major holdings of these courts rely and refer to prior arguments and 
holdings, but are not summarized into a single all-encompassing case.  
Instead, the cases incorporate similar holdings by reference and adjust 
them to the slightly altered factual basis of each situation.  The closest 
these holdings come to a single all-encompassing viewpoint is the 
unpublished case Google Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, 
Inc.108 
                                                          
 102. Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 402 ([T]here is no allegation that plaintiffs 
trademark is displayed in any of the sponsored links about which plaintiff is concerned.). 
 103. Id. at 400. 
 104. Id. at 403. 
 105. Id. (quoting 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 106.   E.g., Merck & Co., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d at 41516; Fragrancenet.com v. Fragrancex.com, 
Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 545, 54951 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).    
 107. Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 40304. 
 108. Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 
1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007). 
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American Blind & Wallpaper Factory is factually and procedurally 
similar to Rescuecom.  In 2003, Google filed an action for declaratory 
relief seeking a judicial determination that its AdWords advertising 
program [did] not infringe [American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.s] 
trademarks.109  American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc. (American 
Blind) asserted counterclaims and third-party claims against Google and 
several other search engine providers, including Ask Jeeves, Inc. and 
America Online, Inc. for Lanham Act trademark infringement.110  Google 
and the other third-party defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that American Blind failed to allege actionable trademark 
use.111  Claiming novelty of the legal issues, the court denied the 
motion solely for the purpose of allowing further development of the 
factual record given the uncertain status of the law.112  Almost two years 
later, Google moved for summary judgment arguing that American Blind 
failed to allege trademark use.113  Relying on analysis conducted in the 
prior motion to dismiss, and subsequent developments in the law in other 
circuits, the court denied this motion by holding that a use in commerce 
existed for purposes of the Lanham Act.114 
The American Blind & Wallpaper Factory court relied on the 
holding supplied in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, 
Inc.,115 (GEICO I), despite noting that the cases were factually 
distinguishable.116  The GEICO I court held that when defendants sell 
the rights to link advertising to plaintiffs trademarks, defendants are 
using the trademarks in commerce in a way that may imply that 
defendants have permission from the trademark holder to do so.117  
More specifically, the court reasoned that this implication of permission 
constituted a use in commerce because advertisers could directly 
purchase rights in their competitors trademarks.118  The court further  
 
                                                          
 109. Id. at *1. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL 
832398, at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005). 
 112. See id. at *5, *67 (denying dismissal given the uncertain status of the law but purposefully 
declining to express an opinion as to whether the search engines will prevail against American 
Blinds claims). 
 113. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 WL 1159950, at *12. 
 114. Id. at *6. 
 115. 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 116. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 WL 1159950, at *4. 
 117. Govt Employees Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704. 
 118. See id. (stating that the marketing of protected marks themselves as keywords in which 
advertisers could directly purchase rights constitutes a trademark use in commerce). 
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reasoned that the mere act of purchasing trademarks as keyword triggers 
is in itself a trademark use by relying on (now reversed) case law.119 
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory also referenced the analysis 
conducted in 800-JR-Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc.120 as support for its 
holding that the use in commerce requirement was satisfied.121  The case 
is factually distinguishable from the Google cases given that in 800-JR 
Cigar the sponsored links were combined with the organic search 
results,122 while in the Google cases they were separately identified as 
Sponsored Links.123  Nevertheless, American Blind & Wallpaper 
Factory still considered the rationale to be significantly on point to 
support its decision.  800 JR-Cigar offered three reasons supporting the 
occurrence of a use in commerce in the purchase and sale of trademarked 
search terms.  First, GoTos acceptance of bids from competitors paying 
for prominence in search results constituted the act of trading on the 
value of the trademarks.124  The second conclusion, factually 
distinguishable from the Google cases, was that by ranking its paid 
advertisers before any [organic] listings in a search results list, GoTo has 
injected itself into the marketplace, acting as a conduit to steer potential 
customers away from JR[-Cigar] to JR[-Cigar]s competitors.125  The 
final reason, arguably factually distinguishable, was that a trademark use 
occurred given that it marketed trademark terms as effective search 
terms.126  Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com offered a similar 
argument, stating that given the plain meaning of the use in commerce 
definition of the Lanham Act, the purchases of search terms that include 
the plaintiffs trademark to generate sponsored links are commercial uses 
of the trademark.127 
                                                          
 119. See id. at 703 (relying on findings in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. 
Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), revd, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 120. 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 121. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 WL 1159950, at *6. 
 122. See 800-JR Cigar, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d at 27778 (After all paying advertisers sites are 
listed as search results, GoTo lists unpaid . . . listings, i.e. those whose sites are most logically 
relevant to the search criteria. (emphasis added)). 
 123. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (When 
an Internet user enters the keyword, it triggers the sponsored link to appear on the search results page 
either to the right or immediately above the search results.); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper 
Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL 832398, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (Sponsored 
Links appear at the top and on the margins of Googles search-results pages.) 
 124. 800-JR Cigar, Inc., 437 F.Supp. 2d at 285. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. (discussing that GoTo.coms Search Term Suggestion Tool identified and marketed 
trademarked search terms to JR Cigars competitors). 
 127. No. Civ. 04-4371JFTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006). 
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The court in Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC 
provides the clearest argument supporting the existence of a use in 
commerce regarding the purchase and sale of trademarks as search term 
keywords by incorporating the holdings of GEICO I, Edina Realty, and 
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory.128  The Buying for the Home court 
held that a purchase of a trademark as a search term is, in itself, a 
commercial transaction occurring in commerce.129  Second, the court 
stated in plain language that there is a use because a plaintiffs 
trademark is used to trigger the commercial advertising, including a link 
to the defendants Web site.130  This reasoning epitomizes the rationale of 
district courts in the Third, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits that the 
action of purchasing or selling the trademark itself constitutes a use in 
commerce within the meaning of the Lanham Act. 
3. The Present Split of Authority 
As demonstrated above, courts are split as to whether the purchase or 
sale of a trademark as a keyword constitutes a use in commerce for 
purposes of trademark infringement pursuant to the Lanham Act.  
Assuming that precedent is not overturned in the near future, one should 
expect Supreme Court intervention soon.131  Moreover, one could expect 
Congressional legislation to play some part in the overall solution, given 
the numerous uncertainties inherent in this issue.  In fact, Congress has 
created similar legislation in the past to address Lanham Act issues 
arising out of the Internet boom, namely for domain name 
cybersquatting.132  Until the Supreme Court or Congress intervenes, a 
careful analysis must be conducted to determine the relevant merits and 
flaws of each of the courts viewpoints in order to determine the correct 
answer for the immediate future. 
                                                          
 128. 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Cohen, supra note 46, at 1. 
 132. See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, at § 25:78 (The 1999 Anti-cybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act was codified as Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. 1125(c).  It was directed at 
preventing the cybersquatting on the Internet by the use of domain names that are confusingly 
similar to trademarks and persons names.)  Cybersquatting is knowingly reserving a domain name 
consisting of the mark or name of a company, for the purpose of relinquishing the right to that 
domain name back to the legitimate owner for a price.  Id. at § 25:77. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
An essential factor in this split of authority concerns the element of 
use.  District courts in the Second Circuit, such as in Rescuecom, 
conclude that the requisite element of a use in commerce in a trademark 
infringement action actually comprises two elements, trademark use 
and in commerce.133  District courts in other circuits, such as the Edina 
Realty court in the Eighth Circuit, rely merely on the plain meaning of 
15 U.S.C. § 1127 in determining if there is a use in commerce.134  The 
Rescuecom courts creation of additional elements for a valid 
infringement claim is flawed because it disregards the statutory language 
present within the Lanham Act itself.  Section 1127 defines the phrase 
use in commerce in its entirety, not in separate pieces.  The Rescuecom 
court splits the phrase into both use and in commerce, utilizing the 
definition provided by § 1127 only when convenient to its analysis.  This 
splitting of the phrase into separate elements then allows the court to 
require additional thresholds for a successful infringement claim beyond 
those specified by the statute.  The causes of action created by § 1114 
and § 1125 explicitly refer to use in commerce in its entirety, not as 
distinct elements.  Therefore, § 1127s definition of the entire phrase 
should be given greater weight in interpretation.  As this Comment will 
show, the definition of the entire phrase as provided in the statute 
weakens Rescuecoms overall analysis.135 
A. The Correct Interpretation of in the Ordinary Course of Trade 
Section 1127 defines use in commerce as the bona fide use of a 
mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in 
a mark.136  Rescuecom gives very little weight to a critical part in the 
definition, in the ordinary course of trade.  Instead, it dismisses this 
requirement by holding that [a]lthough . . . facts may suffice to satisfy 
the in commerce . . . requirement[] at the pleading stage, without an 
allegation of trademark use in the first instance, they cannot sustain a 
                                                          
 133. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 399400 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(relying on 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005), and stating that 
other circuits err by not separating the Lanham Act use in commerce requirement into three 
elements: use, in commerce, and likelihood of confusion). 
 134. See Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JFTFLN, 2006 WL 
737064, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (holding the purchase of trademarked search terms is a use 
in commerce based on the plain meaning of the Lanham Act). 
 135. See infra Parts III.AB. 
 136. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
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cause of action for trademark infringement.137  The court fails to 
consider the use in commerce requirement as a whole because it 
prematurely determined that it lacks the fictional requirement of 
trademark use.  This strict adherence to precedent ignores a 
fundamental purpose of Congresss addition of in the ordinary course of 
trade to the statutory definition.  Prior to 1988, the statutory definition 
of use in commerce omitted that phrase in its entirety and merely stated 
when a use in commerce is deemed to occur for a good or service.138  
Congress revised its prior definition so that use would be interpreted 
with flexibility so as to encompass various genuine, but less traditional 
trademark uses.139  The district courts devotion to the idea of 
trademark use, as opposed to the entire statutory definition provided by 
Congress, errs by failing to incorporate this flexible interpretation 
mandate. 
At its simplest, one would expect the phrase the ordinary course of 
trade would include sales and purchases within its definition.  Blacks 
Law Dictionary defines trade as either [t]he business of buying and 
selling or bartering goods or services or [a] transaction or swap.140  
Applied to the search engine context, search engines are in the business 
of selling search term keywords to purchasers, which also include other 
entities trademarks.  The search engine derives its income from 
purchasers paying for the goodwill associated with these trademarks 
because they are trading on the value associated with their 
competitors trademark.141  Computer users input trademarks as their 
search terms based on the feelings of goodwill they already hold toward 
particular marks.142  The purchasers and sellers of trademarked 
keywords are trading off of the goodwill in the mark by causing their 
own advertisements to appear based on the computer users input of 
these trademarks.143 
                                                          
 137. Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 412). 
 138. See Lanham Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 10511127) (For the purposes of this Act, a mark shall be deemed to be used in 
commerce (a) on goods when it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the 
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto and the goods are sold or 
transported in commerce and (b) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of 
services and the services are rendered in commerce.). 
 139. Bartholomew, supra note 62, at 187 n.53 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACT OF 1998, S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 44 (1988)). 
 140. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1529 (8th ed. 2004). 
 141. Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (D.N.J. 
2006). 
 142. Bartholomew, supra note 62, at 211. 
 143. Id. at 218. 
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In the alternative, the purchase of search term keywords should be 
considered a standard business practice of the entity owning the 
trademark.  In 2006, online advertising revenue totaled $16.8 billion in 
the United States alone.144  Although Internet advertisements account for 
only 4.7% of advertising expenses,145 there were 5,357,966,000 portal 
and search engine impressions during the week of September 16, 2007 
alone.146  An impression is the number of times an ad is rendered for 
viewing.147  A substantial portion of these impressions were likely 
triggered by a computer user inputting a search term that an advertiser 
had previously purchased as its trigger.  Given that companies famous 
for their advertising, such as Coca-Cola and AT&T, purchase advertising 
on the Internet in large quantities,148 one could infer that the purchase of 
keyword search terms is a typical form of conducting business (or, at the 
very least, is quickly becoming that way).  In fact, keyword-triggered 
advertising constituted more than 40% of Internet advertising spending 
in 2004, a number that has likely grown since.149  The Restatement of 
Unfair Competition defines use in the ordinary course of business as 
uses that are typical in the particular market or trade in which the mark 
is used.150  Applied in the Internet context, it is likely a typical practice 
of companies to purchase keywords to trigger their sponsored links to 
achieve their ultimate goal of generating revenue.  Substituting this 
standard practice into the language of 15 U.S.C. § 1114, the cause of 
action would read: 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant [make a 
typical purchase of a keyword to generate a sponsored link that is a] 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered 
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of any goods or services or in connection with use likely to 
cause confusion . . . shall be liable in a civil action . . . .151 
                                                          
 144. In Brief. Online Ad Revenue Sets Record for a Third Year, supra note 1. 
 145. Story, supra note 2, at 6. 
 146. Nielsen//NetRatings AdRelevance, Top Site Genres, http://www.adrelevance.com/ 
intelligence/intel_dataglance.jsp?sr=36808&flash=false (last visited Sept. 24, 2007). 
 147. Nielsen//NetRatings, Nielsen//NetRatings Reports Topline U.S. Data for Aug. 2007, Top 10 
Advertisers, Aug. 2007, http://www.netratings.com/pr/pr_070910.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2007). 
 148. Nielsen//NetRatings AdRelevance, Leading CPG Advertisers, http://www.adrelevance. 
com/intelligence/intel_dataglance.jsp?sr=36810&flash=false (last visited Sept. 24, 2007). 
 149. Markoff & Ives, supra note 3. 
 150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18 cmt. c (1995).  It should be noted 
that the Restatement refers to the ordinary course of business while 15 U.S.C. § 1127 refers to the 
ordinary course of trade.  However, in this context, trade is synonymous with business. 
 151. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 
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Applying the Restatements definition, indicating this is a typical 
business transaction, implies that use in commerce is thereby satisfied 
in the purchase and sale of trademarked search terms.  That is, the 
purchase of the search term triggers are a standard business practice as 
defined by the Restatement, in the form of company advertising, thereby 
constituting a use in commerce.  Thus, using the competitors trademark 
in commerce by the typical practice of advertising substantiates the cause 
of action in § 1114, assuming that other necessary elements such as a 
likelihood of confusion are met. 
B. Section 1127s Expository Statements of What Is Deemed to Be Use 
in Commerce 
1. When Services Are Deemed Uses in Commerce 
In order to give additional clarity to the definition of use in 
commerce, § 1127 also provides expository statements of when a 
trademark is deemed to be in use in commerce.152  For services, it 
deems that a trademark is used in commerce when it is used or 
displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are 
rendered in commerce . . . .153  The Rescuecom court, in holding that 
trademark infringement suits centered on purchases and sales of 
trademarked search terms are precluded by a lack of use in commerce, 
fails to analyze a crucial component of this expository statement: when 
the trademark is used or displayed in the . . . advertising of services.154  
In Rescuecom, the court held that there was no use in commerce because 
the defendant search engine did not display the actual trademark in the 
text of the sponsored search results.155  In doing so, the court is equating 
use with display alone.156  This methodology errs because the statutory 
definition never equates display to use, implying the two terms display 
and use have separate meanings.157  Therefore, Rescuecoms error  
 
                                                          
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 401 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Frye, supra note 55, at 121 (Referring to a case involving trademark infringement for 
pop-up advertisers, stating the [S]econd [C]ircuits reasoning thus far seems to equate use with the 
display alone and to put aside the possibility that use can include more than just one display. . . .  
[N]othing in the statutory definition suggests that use in commerce in this context must, to qualify 
as use, affect the appearance or functionality of the owners website.). 
 157. See id. 
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manifests itself by relying on the notion that use in commerce must affect 
the appearance or functionality of a Web site. 
The Second Circuit identifies commercial advertising under the 
Lanham Act as being part of an organized campaign to penetrate the 
relevant market.158  Under this definition, a purchaser of a trademarked 
search term is purchasing as part of an organized campaign to penetrate 
the trademark holders market.  In other words, businesses use the 
trademarked keyword advertising triggers as a technique to enter into the 
growing electronic commerce market.159  Because this meets the 
definition of advertising, the trademark is being used in the 
advertising.  Therefore, § 1127 would deem this a use in commerce. 
The use in commerce requirement is also satisfied when the general 
dictionary meaning is applied to the term advertising.  Blacks Law 
Dictionary defines advertising as [t]he action of drawing the publics 
attention to something to promote its sale.160  Similarly, Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary defines advertising as the act or practice of 
calling public attention to ones product, service, need, etc., by paid 
announcements in newspapers and magazines, over radio or television, 
on billboards etc.161  Substituting the Blacks Law Dictionary definition 
into the § 1127 statutory language, the provision reads: when it is used 
in [the action of drawing the publics attention to promote its sale].  
Obviously, companies purchase the trademark of another entity as a 
search term in an attempt to draw the publics attention in order to 
advance their own sales.  At its very core, then, the purchase of these 
trademarked keywords falls with the purpose of advertising as utilized 
in § 1127. 
When using these definitions as support for the use in commerce 
requirement, it is apparent that the argument only applies to purchasers 
of the trademarked search terms and not to search engines themselves.  
However, the various forms of secondary liability would likely transfer 
the logical reasoning employed above to the search engines as sellers of 
                                                          
 158. See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 482 (2d Cir. 2004) (The touchstone of 
whether a defendants actions may be considered commercial advertising or promotion under the 
Lanham Act is that the contested representations are part of an organized campaign to penetrate the 
relevant market. (quoting Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 57 
(2d Cir. 2002))). 
 159. See Bartholomew, supra note 62, at 179 (The explosive growth of e-commerce comes at a 
price.  As commercial Web sites multiply, businesses are looking for new techniques to break 
through the informational clutter.  One such technique that has received considerable attention is the 
use of Internet search engines for keyword search advertising.). 
 160. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 140, at 59. 
 161. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993).  The term etc. in this 
definition would include the Internet. 
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the trademarked search phrases.  For example, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. provides for contributory liability under the 
Lanham Act when the entity continues to supply the service when it has 
reason to know of the trademark infringement.162  Applying this 
rationale, a search engine would be contributorily liable by assisting the 
keyword purchasers in their trademark infringement.  Regardless of the 
secondary liability theories, by incorporating the above analysis relating 
to purchasers of trademarked terms, the selling of the trademarked search 
terms are use[s] . . . in the sale . . . of services163 given that the 
trademark is the actual product supplied by the search engine to these 
potential purchasers. 
2. When Goods Are Deemed Uses in Commerce 
Unfortunately, a similar analysis of when a use in commerce is 
deemed for goods, according to § 1127, is much more tenuous.  Section 
1127 states that a trademark is used in commerce on goods when 
it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the 
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or 
if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on 
documents associated with the goods or their sale, and . . . the goods 
are sold or transported in commerce.164 
The initial analysis should focus on whether the trademark is placed on a 
display associated therewith.  Random House Unabridged Dictionary 
defines a display, among several definitions, as an exhibition.165  This 
definition does not satisfy the use in commerce requirement because, as 
in most of the search engine trademark cases, the trademark is not 
actually being displayed, but rather is being used as a trigger.  Likewise, 
any analysis should focus on whether a trademarked keyword is a 
document associated with the goods or their sale.  Older definitions of 
the term document define the word in the context of a tangible 
object,166 thereby precluding its application as a sponsored link trigger 
given that it exists only in cyberspace.  However, the computer 
revolution has modernized this terms definition to reflect its 
                                                          
 162. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 164. Id. 
 165. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 161, at 568. 
 166. See, e.g., id. at 578 (defining document as any written item, as a book, article, or letter, 
esp. of a factual or informative nature). 
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technological usage.  Merriam-Websters dictionary defines document 
as a computer file containing information input by a computer user and 
usually created with an application (as a word processor).167  Although 
still tenuous, this definition partially supports the finding of a use in 
commerce for a good because the trademark is being used in a computer 
file input by a computer user.  Specifically, search engines maintain 
some database computer file that contains the trademark.  Although the 
definition favors the standard word processing context, this does not 
completely foreclose such a definition, thereby granting some merit to 
this argument.  In fact, in Hamzik v. Zale Corp., a district court in the 
Second Circuit acknowledged in dictum that such an argument could 
succeed within a specific set of factual circumstances, but declined to 
pursue the merits of such reasoning.168  Nevertheless, such reasoning is 
merely conjectural and poorly supported. 
3. The Services Nature of Internet Commerce 
Determining if a use in commerce exists in the purchase and sale of 
trademarked search terms therefore depends on whether the trademark is 
used on a good or service.  In the majority of sponsored link uses, the 
sponsored link or advertisement is a service and not a good.  Sponsored 
links often direct or advertise an entitys services to a customer.  For 
example, the plaintiff in Rescuecom offers repair and consulting 
services.169  Any party purchasing Rescuecom as a search term 
keyword would likely be offering similar services.  Similarly, the 
defendant in Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com offers realty and 
brokerage services.170  It can be concluded, then, that these companies 
are offering services and not goods; the correct § 1127 exposition would 
also be when a mark is deemed to be in use in commerce on 
services.171 
Companies advertising a product through a sponsored link are more 
likely advertising a service that provides a product to a consumer.  For 
                                                          
 167. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
document. 
 168. See Hamzik v. Zale Corp./Delaware, No. 3:06-cv-1300, 2007 WL 1174863, at *3 n.4 
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007) (stating that an argument could be made . . . that the link are documents 
associated with the goods or their sale when a link directs the computer user to a site that uses the 
trademark without permission). 
 169. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 170. Edina Realty v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JFTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, at *1 
(D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006). 
 171. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
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example, Amazon.com sells books and other consumer products over the 
Internet.172  If Amazon.com appears as a sponsored link, the Web site 
itself is not a product, but rather a service that provides the product to the 
consumer.  As a result, the services example from § 1127 applies 
instead of the goods example, and therefore a use in commerce exists.  
Expanding this logic, assume that Coach, a producer of handbags, 
purchases the trademark of a specific type of Prada handbag as a search 
term.  Subsequently, a computer user inputs the Prada handbags 
trademarked name into a search engine, triggering a sponsored link of a 
similar Coach handbag to appear.  Although this similar Coach handbag 
is itself a good, if the Web site sells the good, it is offering the service of 
providing the good.  In other words, the trademark was used as a search 
term to trigger the Web site that is a service that ships Coach handbags.  
Again, the services exposition from § 1127 would then apply in 
contrast to the goods exposition.  Given that the services exposition 
satisfies the use in commerce requirement, the cause of action would not 
be defeated, unlike when utilizing the goods exposition.  However, this 
logical analysis also prevents some triggers of sponsored links from 
becoming uses in commerce.  If a provider of goods does not sell its 
goods online, and the sponsored link is merely an advertisement for that 
product, the goods exposition will then apply because no service is 
provided.  The goods exposition application would thereby preclude a 
finding of a use in commerce because the trademark would not be used 
on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or 
on the tags or on the labels affixed thereto, or . . . on documents 
associated with the goods or their sale.173  Therefore, although a 
determination of whether the trademark is used on a service or a good is 
initially critical to determining if there is a use in commerce, in most 
instances this initial determination is irrelevant because most Internet 
Web sites can be classified as services by their very nature. 
C. The Flaws in the Rescuecom Courts Analysis 
The Rescuecom district court, following Second Circuit precedent, 
primarily relies on the same basic arguments in support of the holding 
that the purchase and sale of trademarks as search term triggers are not 
uses in commerce under the Lanham Act.  The initial argument, 
discussed earlier, involved the separation of the use in commerce 
                                                          
 172. Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). 
 173. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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requirement within the cause of action into two entirely separate 
elements; use and in commerce.174  The court buttresses this 
argument with two additional arguments principally introduced in 1-800 
Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.175 and Merck & Co. v. Mediplan 
Health Consulting, Inc.176  These arguments utilize several analogies 
comparing the alleged infringement to non-trademark and non-Internet 
scenarios.  Although well reasoned and thoroughly analyzed, the 
analogies fail as a result of several logical fallacies and factual 
distinctions that cause their use to be inapplicable in the search engine 
advertising context. 
1. The Failings of the Internal Utilization Analogy 
1-800 Contacts held that [a] companys internal utilization of a 
trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the public is 
analogous to a[sic] individuals private thoughts about a trademark177 
and therefore does not violate the Lanham Act because it, inter alia, is 
not a use in commerce.178  In 1-800 Contacts, the plaintiff alleged that 
the defendants pop-up ads infringed on its trademarks by delivering 
these pop-up ads of the plaintiffs competitors when computer users 
accessed the plaintiffs Web site.179  A pop-up ad is an advertisement 
generated by any number of parties that appears on a computer users 
computer screen while surfing the Internet and clicking on specific links.  
In this case, the defendant provided special software, downloaded by 
computer users, that generated pop-up advertisements when certain 
words were typed into a Web browser or search engine, or when a 
computer user visited certain Internet sites.180  To generate these pop-up 
ads, the software employ[ed] an internal directory comprising 
approximately 32,000 [Web site addresses] and [address] fragments, 
29,000 search terms and 1,200 keyword algorithms.181  This internal 
                                                          
 174. See Rescuecom Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 399400 (relying on 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005)  and stating that other circuits err by not separating 
the Lanham Act use in commerce requirement into three elements: use, in commerce, and 
likelihood of confusion). 
 175. 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 176. 431 F. Supp. 2d 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 177. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 409. 
 178. See id. (Such conduct simply does not violate the Lanham Act, which is concerned with 
the use of trademarks in connection with the sale of goods or services in a manner likely to lead to 
consumer confusion as to the source of such goods or services.). 
 179. Id. at 405. 
 180. Id. at 404. 
 181. Id. (quoting Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 743 (E.D. Mich. 
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directory listed the plaintiffs Web address, containing its registered 
trademark within it.182  Given that the trademark was only used internally 
by the defendant to trigger the advertisements, the court held that there 
was no use in commerce, as the use was not in connection with the sale 
of goods or services.183 
Trademarked search term cases, such as Rescuecom, follow the 
reasoning in 1-800 Contacts on the grounds that the search engines 
internal use of the trademark is invisible to the public.184  However, these 
cases ignore one critical distinguishing fact: the search engines are 
selling the trademarks and the sponsored link advertisers are purchasing 
these trademarked search terms.  That is, the trademark is not merely 
being used as an internal trigger, but rather, the search engine is earning 
money selling the trademark as the trigger.  Likewise, the sponsored link 
advertiser is paying for this trademark to be used as a trigger.  1-800 
Contacts explicitly states that the defendant does not disclose the 
proprietary contents of the . . . directory to its advertising clients nor does 
it permit these clients to request or purchase specified keywords . . . .185  
Therefore, analogizing that such use by a search engine is comparable to 
a persons internal thoughts is flawed because it omits the fact that search 
engines and advertisers buy and sell the trademarks as triggers, which are 
in themselves uses in commerce given the statutory language.  That is, 
when a person buys or sells something, they do not think the 
transaction, but instead, physically conduct it.  In fact, in Hamzik v. Zale 
Corp., the district court acknowledged that this factual distinction may 
give rise to a Lanham Act use.186  District courts outside of the Second 
Circuit have recognized this important distinction and refused to 
incorporate the analogy as support for their holdings.187  Instead, these 
courts have refuted the analogy, stating that the opportunity to reach 
consumers via alleged purchase and/or use of a protected trademark . . . 
cross[es] the line from internal use to use in commerce under the Lanham 
Act.188 
                                                          
2003)). 
 182. Id. at 408. 
 183. Id. at 409. 
 184. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(referencing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. and stating that the trademarks use is not visible to the public). 
 185. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 409. 
 186. Hamzik v. Zale Corp./Delaware, No. 3:06-cv-1300, 2007 WL 1174863, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 19, 2007). 
 187. E.g., J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. Pship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 
WL 30115, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007). 
 188. Id. 
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2. The Failings of the Product Placement Analogy 
District courts within the Second Circuit also rely heavily on an 
analogy presented in Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc189 
as support for denying the occurrence of a use in commerce.  In Merck, 
plaintiff Merck, a pharmaceutical company, filed suit against several 
Canadian online pharmacies for trademark infringement of the mark 
Zocor after the defendants purchase of the trademark as a search 
term.190  In explaining its holding, the court posited: 
Here, in the search engine context, defendants do not place the 
Z[ocor] marks on goods, containers, displays, or associated documents, 
nor do they use the marks to indicate sources of sponsorship.  Rather, 
the marks are used only in the sense that a computer users search of 
the keyword Zocor will trigger the display of sponsored links to 
defendants websites.  This internal use of the keyword Zocor is not 
use of the mark in the trademark sense; rather, this use is more akin to 
the product placement marketing strategy employed in retail stores, 
where, for example, a drug store places its generic products alongside 
similar national brand products to capitalize on the latters name 
recognition.  The sponsored link marketing strategy is the electronic 
equivalent of product placement in a retail store.191 
This analogy fails, however, because it inaccurately describes the 
situation.  In the context of search engines, the analogy would suggest 
that if Google placed its own Web sites as sponsored links, then there 
would not be a use in commerce because this would be the electronic 
equivalent of product placement in a retail store.192  Instead, the correct 
context is that of Google selling and purchasers buying these sponsored 
links.  The Merck analogy misconstrues the factual background and 
forgets that search engines are earning money from the trademark, and 
that advertisers are purchasing the trademark.  Therefore, the correct 
analogy would be the following scenario: Nike purchases the trademark 
Adidas from Foot Locker.  Every time a customer enters Foot Locker 
and requests a pair of Adidas shoes, the Foot Locker employee then 
brings out a pair of Nike shoes and a pair of Adidas shoes. 
                                                          
 189. 425 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 190. Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 191. Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 192. Id. 
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To make the analogy even more accurate, imagine that Foot Locker 
receives five dollars every time a customer requests Adidas and the 
employee brings Nike shoes.  In this sense, Foot Locker is using the 
Adidas trademark in commerce by selling it to competitors as 
advertising.  Likewise, Nike is using the trademark in commerce by 
purchasing it from a company besides the trademark owner. 
D. A Trademark Analogy Solution for Avoiding Lanham Act Liability 
A solution exists to avoid use of a trademark in commerce within the 
Lanham Act sense when using keyword advertising.  This solution 
reconciles the conflicting case law in most respects.  To avoid a Lanham 
Act use in commerce, the purchase and sale of general categories as 
search terms, rather than trademark names as search terms, would 
preclude liability if a computer users search of a trademarked term 
triggered its more general encompassing category.  For example, Toyota 
would purchase the keyword car from the search engine as its trigger 
of the sponsored link.  When a computer user later typed the word 
Ford into the search engine, this could trigger within the search 
engines internal code the generic category of car.  The category of 
car would then trigger any sponsored links that have been purchased 
for the search term car.   
This is similar to a company buying an advertisement in the yellow 
pages of a phone book.  Imagine that Blackacre Painters, a local painting 
company, purchases an advertisement within the house painting section 
of the yellow pages.  In the phone book, the advertisement is only a few 
millimeters away from the phone listing of its rival local painting 
company, Jayhawk Painting Co.  Jayhawk Painting Co. has registered its 
name as a trademark.  A potential consumer searching for Jayhawk 
Painting Co., using the yellow pages, would find both Jayhawk Painting 
Co. and its rival Blackacre Painters.  Given that the user did not search 
for the trademarked name Jayhawk Painting Co., but instead, the general 
category of commerce, there was no use in commerce.  However, if 
Blackacre Painters purchased the right to have its advertisement appear 
next to Jayhawk Painting Co. in the white pages of the phone book, there 
is a use in commerce because the trademark is used in the advertising of 
services.193   
                                                          
 193. It is important to remember that just because this can be classified as a use in commerce per 
15 U.S.C. § 1127, it does not automatically create a valid trademark infringement claim.  The 
aggrieved party must still prove that the other elements of a valid trademark infringement claim are 
satisfied, including that a likelihood of confusion exists.  Moreover, there are several affirmative 
 
07 - COLYER FINAL.DOC 6/17/2008  9:10:19 PM 
708 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Applied in the search engine context, search engines could avoid 
liability by converting their systems to the electronic equivalents of 
phone book yellow pages that effectively assist the consumer by 
identifying the proper category for his purposes.  Moreover, this form of 
advertising trigger would support the dominant rationale for protecting 
trademarks [which is] reducing consumer search costs.194  Creating a 
yellow pages-type advertising system presents the relevant information 
to the consumer efficiently without piggy-backing on the trademark. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The plain meaning of the Lanham Acts definition of use in 
commerce, and the Rescuecom courts flawed reasoning, demonstrates 
that a use in commerce exists in the purchase and sale of trademarked 
search terms for purposes of Lanham Act liability for trademark 
infringement.  The primary analogies buttressing the holdings of the 
district courts in the Second Circuit are factually distinguishable, and 
therefore improperly relied upon.  Moreover, the literal or plain meaning 
application of the definition provided within the Lanham Act indicates 
that a use in commerce exists when trademarked search terms are sold or 
purchased to trigger advertising.  A solution exists, however, for 
purchasers and sellers of search terms to avoid Lanham Act liability by 
merely purchasing and selling categories of search terms in such a 
manner as to replicate the functionality of a common yellow pages phone 
book. 
Nevertheless, the mere existence of this important use in commerce 
element of these causes of action still does not guarantee that trademark 
infringement has in fact occurred because there are several other 
elements that must be satisfied.  For example, the likelihood of confusion 
test, factually distinguishable in almost every case, can be a difficult 
hurdle to meet for purposes of proving liability.  Regardless, continued 
litigation is inevitable given the legal uncertainties related to this form of 
advertising.  This ambiguity in the law will undoubtedly lead to forum 
shopping and endless appellate litigation until Congress or the United 
States Supreme Court chooses to intervene and resolve the judicial split.  
Until that time, maybe the courts should look to search engines like 
Google for guidance.  A search for the term Google using Googles 
                                                          
defenses, such as classic fair use and nominative fair use that could preclude a Lanham Act 
trademark infringement action.  Therefore, although there is a use in commerce in this analogy, the 
other requisite elements are likely missing or insufficient to support a valid cause of action. 
 194. Bartholomew, supra note 62, at 195. 
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search engine leads to just one sponsored link: www.google.com/ig.195  If 
a search of the worlds most valuable196 brand on its very own search 
engine initiates not even a single sponsored link of a third party, one can 
infer that Google does not sell its own trademark on AdWords.  It 
appears, then, that Google does not want another company using its 
trademark to trigger sponsored links to competing sites.  Doesnt this 
indicate that Google wants to keep others from infringing upon its 
trademark? 
 
                                                          
 195. Google, http://www.google.com, (search using the term Google) (last visited Jan. 19, 
2008). 
 196. See Google Sells Ads, but Wont Spend Much on Them, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 14, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21295728/  (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).   
